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Review Essays 
Awareness and Amnesia: 
Malcolm Bowie's Freud, Proust and Lacan 
Mary Lydon 
The University of Wisconsin-Madison 
Bowie, Malcolm. Freud, Proust and Lacan: Theory as Fiction. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1987. Pp. 225. 
This interesting, extremely well-written and gratifyingly literate 
book is divided into five chapters (framed by an introduction and an 
epilogue) as follows: 1. Freud's dreams of knowledge; 2. Proust, 
jealousy, knowledge; 3. Freud and Proust; 4. Lacan; and 5. Lacan and 
literature. The elements making up the pattern of Bowie's mosaic 
emerge clearly enough from this list: dreams, knowledge, jealousy and 
literature-as they relate to Freud, Proust and Lacan-not to men- 
tion, I would add (since as its author, he is not and cannot be men- 
tioned in the series, except by another) Malcolm Bowie himself, 
implicitly. The word "mosaic" is appropriate not only because the 
book consists of a series of related essays, but also because beginning 
with Freud's phrase: "Saxa loquuntur"! ("Stones talk"!) quoted on 
page 19, a certain "stony" motif may be seen at work throughout, 
manifest thematically, for example, in the stones of Venice of the 
Proust chapter and culminating materially, as it were, in the 
"bedrock" evoked in the book's final sentence. 
Bowie takes as his point of departure the observation that 
"[h]ypotheses were . . . both frowned upon and assiduously cul- 
tivated by Freud" (16) as he pursued his dream of the science of 
psychoanalysis-his desire that its discoveries have the validity and 
be accorded the status of scientific truth. Acknowledging that Freud's 
ambivalence towards theory is there for all to read "on the invitingly 
intelligible surface that Freud imparted to his 'public' essays" (16- 
17), Bowie proposes to review Freud's "anti-theoretical and philo- 
theoretical tendencies" in their "less official and less responsible 
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guises," to explore "the wishful substratum of Freud's scientific 
writings" (17). He will do so by tracing the fantasmatic presence of 
the archaeologist and the conquistador ("both are enthusiasts for 
hardness" 1371) as favored self-images in Freud's text. 
What is at once noteworthy and predictable about Bowie's 
declared intention, given the psychoanalytic perspective he adopts, is 
that it is both facilitated by and repetitive of Freud's own theory of the 
unconscious. The situation is the familiar one whereby (to paraphrase 
T. S. Eliot) it is inevitably Freud that we know, whenever as active 
readers of his text, we claim to know more than him. It is a matter, in 
other words, of reading Freud with the aid of techniques he first made 
available in his elaboration of psychoanalysis, notably the gleich- 
schwebende Atdrnerksamkeit or "evenly suspended attention," and 
its accessory, displacement; the former permitting the analyst to resist 
the patient's (and his own) well-nigh irresistible urge to make sense, 
the latter allowing the dreamer to evade censorship by shifting the 
emphasis and focus of the dream-thoughts onto the apparently irrele- 
vant or trivial. To read psychoanalytically is (in a sense!) to "stop 
making sense." The paradox is that the reading can only be recog- 
nized as successful (i.e. convincing) by eventually making sense, 
albeit otherwise. Hence the assumption that non-sense, however long 
and tolerantly indulged, must eventually be revealed as merely appar- 
ent if understanding is to result. Non-sense, in other words (or so at 
least received opinion would have it) must eventually yield to sense. 
Freud, seeing himself alternately, in Bowie's account, as 
archaeologist and conquering hero, wants at the same time to reach 
the bedrock underlying the stratified archaeological site he some- 
times took the unconscious to be and to discover and annex new 
territory (the unconscious as radically unknowable) for his mental 
science. In the first instance the need for theory could be dispensed 
with when "the hard, indestructible, 'original' psychical material" 
was reached; in the second the fact of repression (the necessary condi- 
tion, according to Freud, for the existence of an unconscious) must 
preclude any but a theoretical, i.e. hypothetical, knowledge of the 
latter. For if repression is admitted, then not only the content of the 
unconscious, but its very existence (like that of America for 
Columbus) can only be deduced-predicated, as Freud was the first 
to perceive, on its manifestation in dreams and in the great variety of 
slips and errors to which it gives rise. Pointing to the simultaneous 
plasticity (Plastizitat) and adhesiveness (1-10(fahigkeit) of the libido 2




as Freud would eventually conceive it, Bowie concludes that "as a 
theorist Freud was, in his own terms, both an adhesive and a mobile 
libidinal type" (44), and the book's transition from Freud's "unruly 
dreams of knowledge" (44) to Proust's jealous lover's "call to know" 
hinges on the implication that science, "like all works of the mind [is a 
work] of passion too" (65). So is literary criticism, I might add, how- 
ever equivocal its status as art or science. Indeed Bowie obliquely 
acknowledges as much when he attributes to Freud's commentators 
archaeological ambitions and dreams of conquest similar to Freud's 
own, wryly remarking that "even commentators are seekers after 
buried meaning and aspirants to heroic status" (30). 
In "Proust, jealousy, knowledge" Bowie directs his attention to 
what he regards as the largely unread (repressed?) volumes of La 
Recherche: Sodome et Gomorrhe, La Prisonniere and La Fugitive. 
Concentrating on La Prisonniere in particular, he represents the 
jealous narrator's interminable speculation as to Albertine's putative 
mendacity (and hence her sexual orientation) as "a dynamics of 
knowing, a portrait of the mind in process" (58). Furthermore, by 
showing how Proust's brilliant hypothesis-maker simultaneously 
wishes to make hypothesizing redundant (he entertains the fantasy of 
a "total intelligence"-the result of an impossible omnipresence in 
Albertine's life-that "would require of him no more than a small final 
inductive jump for the abiding truths of Albertine's character to 
emerge"), Bowie can argue that 
What we have here . . . in this competition between two modes of 
jealous inquiry is the rough sketch of a debate between the 
inductive and hypothetico-deductive methods. Methods that 
philosophers of science have striven to formulate clearly, and 
that have been defended in their arguments with formidable 
mathematical and logical weapons, are rediscovered by Proust's 
narrator as the spontaneous impulses of a mind under conditions 
of torment. (55) 
It is not simply then that science is a passion, but that passion too 
(or at least jealousy) is a kind of science. Indeed Bowie will charac- 
terize jealousy as it is represented in La Recherche as 
the quest for knowledge in a terrifyingly pure form: a quest for 
knowledge untrammeled and unsupported by things actually 3
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known. It is a continuous journey towards a receding goal, an 
itinerary with no stopping-places and no land-marks; it is an 
appetite for knowledge, but knows nothing: 'La jalousie, qui a un 
bandeau sur les yeux, n'est pas seulement impuissante a rien 
decouvrir dans les t6nebres qui l' enveloppent, elle est encore un 
de ces supplices oti la tache est a recommencer sans cesse, 
comme celle des Danatles, comme celle d'Ixion' " [Jealousy, 
which is blindfolded, is not merely powerless to discover any- 
thing in the darkness that enshrouds it; it is also one of those tor- 
tures where the task must be incessantly repeated, like that of the 
Danaides, or of Ixion]. (58) 
Or, dare I suggest, like psychoanalysis-that other impossible task 
from whose rigors even Freud sought relief? Hence his intermittent 
efforts to arrest the interminable theorizing that psychoanalysis (his 
own discovery) seemed to demand; when goaded by enthusiasm for a 
new theory or alternatively by intellectual and moral exhaustion, he 
would draw a premature conclusion or lapse momentarily into 
biologism. That is Bowie's interesting thesis, in extension of which I 
would argue that a major element in Lacan's celebrated return to 
Freud is the tenacity with which he continually foregrounds the 
dimension of what Bowie calls "jealous inquiry" in Freud's mental 
science. I mean that even as he continues to assert its scientific status, 
Lacan insists on viewing psychoanalysis as nothing less than "an 
appetite for knowledge [that] knows nothing," "a continuous journey 
towards a receding goal," to adopt the terms Bowie applies to Proust's 
narrator's investigations. It is just this "unknowing" of psy- 
choanalysis as elaborated by Lacan that Shoshana Felman expli- 
cates in her remarkable essay "La Meprise et sa chance" (L'Arc 58, 
1974) but before passing to the third member of Bowie's trinity, I want 
to discuss "Freud and Proust," the chapter to which, as it happens, the 
notion of la meprise, or error, is central. 
Here Bowie offers many valuable insights into the ways in which 
Freud and La Recherche are mutually illuminating, concentrating his 
attention on two of the psychological topics that Freud and Proust 
share, namely errors and slips and bi-sexuality. But the relationship 
between the two writers as Bowie perceives it goes beyond the mere 
fact of such indisputably common interests. Hence an awareness of 
Freud's theory of the unconscious ought to shift the focus of our 
reading, he argues, making us on the one hand properly suspicious of 4




the conclusions Proust's narrator draws from his prolific and 
ingenious theorizing, and on the other, causing us to suspect the 
presence of symptomatic error elsewhere than in those places where 
Proust and/or his narrator are eager to point it out. 
Thus according to Bowie: "Freud helps us to see how many kinds 
and levels of interlocution Proust has inserted into his narrator's tire- 
less soliloquy, and to distrust his psychologizing even when this is of a 
seemingly clairvoyant psychoanalytic kind" (76). Particularly when 
it is "of a seemingly clairvoyant psychoanalytic kind," Bowie will in 
fact claim, because "repression operates against introspective 
analytic performance such as Proust seems to favor." As long there- 
fore as the psychoanalytically informed reader continues to keep the 
fact of repression in mind (though as Bowie and others have 
suggested, even Freud found this difficult if not impossible to do con- 
sistently), he or she will find it necessary 
to look beyond the smooth psychological speculations of 
Proust's narrator, to distrust his masterful voice and to ask 
whether an alternative psychology-more unstable, more dialec- 
tical and more discontinuous-may not also be ingrained in 
Proust's text. (68) 
But this attitude can not be limited to Proust's text exclusively, I 
suggest, and hence a book such as Freud, Proust and Lacan in which 
"smooth speculations" (if not precisely "psychological" ones) 
uttered by a "masterful voice" abound, must invite the same kind of 
scrutiny to which it would subject Proust's recherche. "For every new 
access of awareness that the impassioned theorist achieves, a new 
amnesia is exacted," Bowie writes (65), prompting speculation as to 
the cost in amnesia of the insights achieved in his own book. That 
Bowie would resist identification with "the impassioned theorist" 
may be respectfully bracketed, I believe. Despite his reluctance to 
claim the status of a "work of theory" for Freud, Proust and Lacan 
(he describes it as "merely a work of theory-tinged criticism" [11]), 
there is more than enough passion and theory (and passion about 
theory) in it to warrant the description. But before attempting to 
pursue this point further, I want first of all to take up the discussion of 
errors and slips in La Recherche. 
The most dramatic example of error in Proust's error-ridden 
novel (and it is all the more dramatic for being textual) is the famous 5
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telegram, ostensibly signed "Albertine," that Proust's narrator 
receives in Venice. Albertine has in fact been dead for some time. The 
signature turns out somewhat improbably to be a distortion of 
"Gilberte," the name of the actual sender, and Bowie's discussion of 
this episode is the occasion for one of several inspired close readings 
of Proust and Lacan that distinguish his book. 
Passing over the succession of elaborate theories that the nar- 
rator advances to account for his misreading of the signature, Bowie 
focuses on the following pronouncement: "Une bonne partie de ce que 
nous croyons, et jusque dans les conclusions derrieres c'est ainsi, 
avec un entetement et une bonne foi egales, vient d'une premiere 
meprise sur les premisses" (74). (In Terence Kilmartin's translation: 
"A large part of what we believe to be true [and this applies even to our 
final conclusions] with an obstinacy equalled only by our good faith 
springs from an original mistake in our premises.") 
Allowing his attention to drift (as Freud recommended) and 
shifting his focus (in the manner developed by Lacan) from the signi- 
fied to the signifier, in other words looking at this sentence as opposed 
to reading it, Bowie arrives at the brilliant insight (or in more Lacanian 
terms, "it occurs to him,") that "A passage that discusses one near- 
miss anagram (Gilberte - Albertine) as the revealer of a hidden wish 
ends with another, emphatic and still more complex: premiere - 
meprise -premisses" (Regrettably the English, "original-mistake- 
premises" cannot capture the variation on the letters p r e m in 
Proust's phrase, while the anagram meprise - premisses is entirely 
lost.) "In this culminating piece of word-play," Bowie observes (with 
the elegant economy that marks his style), "notions of temporal and 
logical priority threaten to dissolve into the centrally placed notion of 
misapprehension or mistake" (74). 
Allowing my own attention to drift from the word-play he so 
expertly seizes on in Proust's text, and resisting the appeal of the 
masterly conclusion he draws from it, I find myself speculating about 
the formulation, "near-miss anagram," and its status in Bowie's text. 
The first thing to be observed is that what Bowie describes as a "near- 
miss" involves the confusion of two women's names. Both "Gilberte" 
and "Albertine" are of course feminized versions of masculine names, 
and as we have seen, the mobility or plasticity (Plastizitdt) of Alber- 
tine's libido (hence her sexual orientation, clearly irreducible to 
biological gender) is the cause of the narrator's torment. Might one not 
risk the suggestion therefore, that if we take "miss" to be a comple- 6




ment of femininity, then a "near-miss" is exactly what Albertine is in 
Proust's text, and that moreover, Bowie's sentence appears to know 
this, if unknowingly? 
It is not my purpose here to suggest that "Albertine" may be a 
front for some "Albert" (Agostinelli or other). The futility of such 
speculation, in which Proust's own sexuality is inevitably and 
coarsely implicated, has been rightly pointed out by Michel Butor, for 
example. What I am saying, rather, is that the object of Albertine's 
desire remains undecidable, so that for all his theorizing the narrator 
never does find out what or whom she really "wants." 
With the enigma of Albertine's sexuality still in mind, I want to 
return now to an earlier moment in Bowie's book where he cites the 
final paragraph of Freud's 1937 essay "Analysis Terminable and 
Interminable," as an example of how "biology is reintroduced with a 
familiar and terminal force" (39). Here is Bowie, quoting Freud: 
The female's supposed wish for a penis teases the speculative 
psychologist out of thought; it gives him 'the impression that . . . 
we have penetrated through all the psychological strata and have 
reached bedrock, and that thus our activities are at an end. This is 
probably true, since, for the psychical field, the biological field 
does in fact play the part of the underlying bedrock [des 
unterliegenden gewachensen Felsens]. (39) 
The association here between bedrock and so-called Penisneid 
or penis-envy (an association reinforced by the context Bowie 
provides for Freud's statement) is curious to say the least. It appears 
to be an instance in Freud's thought where a premature conclusion 
and a lapse into biology combined are marshalled to call a halt to his 
incessant hypothesizing about femininity. In the present context, 
however, the association of penis-envy with bedrock suggests a 
further connection between Freud and Proust that Bowie leaves 
implicit: namely that the Wifibegierde or drive to knowledge common 
to Proust's narrator and the founder of psychoanalysis is indissolubly 
linked with the enigma of female sexuality. On this view Freud's 
bafflement before what he called "the riddle of femininity" would 
parallel the narrator's incapacity to fix the object of Albertine's 
desire. But more than this, it is the suspicion that the object of her 
desire may precisely not be a penis, I would argue, that prompts the 
narrator's "jealous inquiry": an intuition that one of the most 7
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celebrated set-pieces in La Recherche-Albertine's ice fantasy- 
serves to confirm. 
It will be recalled that this fantasy is properly Albertine's (the 
official "summary" refers to it as "son morceau sur les glaces"), and 
not the narrator's creation. It is a highly polished text, at once pre- 
cious and risque, which the narrator is bound to admire, despite the 
fact that parts of it seem to him too well turned ("trop bien dit"), 
because he attributes Albertine's new-found eloquence to his 
influence upon her. The girl is describing with considerable sensual 
detail, how she would consume a variety of ices shaped like historical 
monuments (the Vendome column etc.) which take on such an 
exaggeratedly and hence hilariously phallic dimension on her tongue 
that the whole passage (punctuated, as the narrator repeatedly 
remarks, by her "cruel" laughter) suggests a high degree of irony on 
the part of its creator. The episode, which might be regarded as 
exemplary of Freud's concept in that fantasies of swallowing the penis 
are characteristic of Penisneid, might just as easily be read as a 
spirited parody of the very notion of penis-envy. This becomes espe- 
cially plausible when one notices that it is the deliquescence of the 
monumental pieces montees rather than their hardness, hence their 
mobility rather than their viscosity (to adopt Freud's terms for the 
libido) that is emphasized. So much for Freud's bedrock, one is 
tempted to remark, but in any event this would seem to be an instance 
where, as Freud himself suggested, inquiry into the nature of feminine 
desire is better served by recourse to the poets than to the explicanda 
of science. 
" 'La verite que poursuit la science,' ecrit Georges Bataille, n'est 
vraie qu' a la condition d'etre depourvue de sens, et rien n'a de sens 
qu'a la condition d'etre fiction.' " (`The truth pursued by science,' 
writes Georges Bataille, 'is true only on condition that it is deprived of 
sense, and nothing makes sense except on condition that it is fiction.') 
This is the opening sentence of Shoshana Felman's essay "La 
Meprise et sa chance," a remarkable discussion of Lacan's theory and 
of the status of theory in Lacan's text. The resonance, of this sentence 
in particular and equally of the text it introduces, for the book under 
review (which is subtitled Theory as Fiction) seems to me startlingly 
clear. It is curious then that neither the essay (which appeared, as I 
noted above, in 1974) nor its author's name (though she has written 
extensively on Lacan) appears anywhere in Bowie's book-a book 
whose bibliographical apparatus is otherwise comprehensive, and is 8




annotated, in addition, with exceptional generosity. Thus a majority 
of the works cited are described as "admirable" and among these 
many are held to be "brilliant" or "indispensable." 
What is one to make of the omission of an essay entitled "La 
Meprise et sa chance" from a book in which a singularly insightful dis- 
cussion of la meprise in the Proustian context plays such an impor- 
tant role? Is "centrally placed" one might even say, echoing Bowie's 
description of Proust's word-play, where "notions of temporal and 
logical priority threaten to dissolve into the centrally placed notion of 
misapprehension or mistake": la meprise not only as a concept, but 
materially, as a signifier, in the manner advocated precisely by Lacan. 
"Si l'ecriture lacanienne s'arrete avec tant d' insistance sur l'opacitth 
de la lettre, sur la materiality du signifiant et de ses sur-prises ana- 
grammatiques," Felman writes, "c'est pour tricher de `rejoindre la 
meprise en son lieu,' en ce lieu de langage ou precisement se situe 
l'ecriture: la ou nous sommes joues." [If Lacan's writing dwells with 
such insistence on the opacity of the letter, on the materiality of the 
signifier and of its anagrammatic sur-prises . . . it is in an effort to 
"meet la meprise on its own ground" in that place of language where 
writing is, the place where we are duped.] (45) The "anagrammatic 
sur-prises" of this statement (to single out just one of the phrases rele- 
vant to the present discussion) will come as no surprise to readers of 
Bowie's book or of this review, and may be taken (since space is 
limited) as emblematic of the coincidence uniting "La Meprise et sa 
chance" with Bowie's masterful reading of la meprise in Proust. The 
coincidence is of course not perfect. Freud, Proust, and Lacan goes 
far beyond Felman's short article. However, re-posing the question I 
raised earlier in a more restricted form, namely, "what is the cost in 
amnesia of Bowie's insight regarding Proust's meprise?" I would now 
venture the response that what is forgotten is Felman's essay: la 
meprise which Bowie was bound to forget in order to arrive at his own 
moment of illumination-about la meprise. To state the matter in the 
anagrammatic Proustian terms he highlights: the "original" 
(premiere) discussion of la meprise in Felman's essay becomes, I 
suggest, one of the unconscious premises (premisses) for Bowie's 
reading of Proust. Unconscious yet visible on "the invitingly 
intelligible surface" of Bowie's text in the expression "near-miss," 
which may then be read as a veiled reference not only to "Gilberte" 
and "Albertine," sources of the narrator's meprise, but also to the 
repressed Felman (the name is surely significant) as well. 9
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In speculating (theorizing?) thus, I have no aspirations to be "the 
source-hunter, the genealogist of ideas [or] the forensic scientist of 
originality" that the otherwise harmless "literary scholar" may 
harbor, (the terms and the quotation marks surrounding "literary 
scholar" are Bowie's and one notes the uncharacteristically hostile 
tone [144]). Rather, the theory I have developed in order to make 
sense of Felman's absence from Bowie's text is pure fiction, in the 
terms made current by both writers, terms that are crystallized in the 
distinction Bataille draws between truth and sense. It is this distinc- 
tion, difficult to grasp and well-nigh impossible to sustain, that is the 
kernel (to adopt a favorite Bowie image) of Lacanian psy- 
choanalysis. Thus Felman writes: "La psychanalyse aspire-t-elle des 
lors a la verite-ou au sens? Quel est le sens de la psychanalyse? Cette 
question est une contradiction dans les termes puisque le sens est 
toujours une fiction et que c' est precisement la psychanalyse qui nous 
l'a appris" (40). [Does psychoanalysis consequently aspire to truth or 
to sense? What is the sense of psychoanalysis? This question is a con- 
tradiction in terms because sense is always a fiction and it is precisely 
psychoanalysis that has taught us so.] "Le sens se sait," [sense knows 
itself], is present to itself, in the form of knowledge-self- 
knowledge-of consciousness. If on the other hand the Freudian 
unconscious makes any sense (I continue to paraphrase Felman) it is 
because it gives utterance to "a knowledge that will not tolerate one's 
knowing that one knows" ("un savoir qui ne supporte pas que l'on 
cache qu'on salt" p. 41) "hence the subject can only get a 'take' 
(prise) on this unconscious knowledge through the mistake (la 
meprise): the non-sense effects recorded in his speech: dreams, slips, 
witticisms" (41). Witticisms such as Bowie's "near-miss," for 
example. 
This complex scenario is represented allegorically by Lacan in 
his recourse to the myth of Diana and Actaeon, which is in turn repre- 
sented pictorially, in Titian's version, both on the cover and within the 
pages of Bowie's book. (Given its high price, $39.50-by no means 
exceptional for a book from Cambridge-the quality of the reproduc- 
tions is, incidentally, extremely disappointing.) Lacan's appropria- 
tion of the myth is expertly discussed in the chapter on Lacan, but 
more interesting from my point of view is the way it serves as the occa- 
sion for the brilliant trouvaille of the book's epilogue, where Bowie 
appropriates Lacan's appropriation of the myth in order to discuss its 
appropriation by Charlus/Proust. 10




Actaeon, who will be turned into a stag and devoured by his own 
hounds as a punishment for having gazed upon the goddess, is hunting 
with bow and arrow when he comes upon Diana at her bath. Titian 
depicts him with a quiver at his back, the bow abandoned at his feet 
where he has dropped it, disarmed, no doubt by the goddess' unveiled 
beauty. This is the detail that Gabrielle Nunn (!) the designer, has 
chosen as an illustration for the jacket of Freud, Proust, Lacan, and 
(consciously, unconsciously?) she has placed the author's name, 
"Malcolm Bowie," low down, in direct line with the descending arc of 
the hunter's abandoned bow. "La Meprise et sa chance," it will be 
recalled, was published in a review called L'Arc or The Bow. It 
appeared in a special number devoted to Lacan in which the con- 
tributors were exclusively women. 
Enough! I shall not pretend that this discussion has been exhaus- 
tive by resorting to some sententious conclusion or axiom with which 
to arrest my speculation. "Lacan reads Freud," Bowie writes. "That 
is the simplest and most important thing about him" (100). Bowie 
reads Freud, Proust and Lacan, often brilliantly. I read Bowie, for my 
pleasure and instruction and, inspired by his text, am stimulated to 
think again about these authors and about reading and writing: my 
own and others'. The horizon of my knowledge is widened by the 
experience, to the point where it can even accommodate, if fleetingly, 
a glimpse of that knowledge that will not tolerate knowing that it 
knows: that mysterious but infallible channel of communication that 
is the unconscious. 
There would be a great deal more to say about the status of 
"theory" and "theories" in Bowie's book, about which he protests to 
the last that "it was not to be a work of theory" (176). The pathos of 
his enterprise may lie in this disclaimer and in the consciousness of a 
need for "a fully interactive theory of social and psychical structure" 
(176) that he articulates belatedly, and in my judgement somewhat 
unconvincingly, at the tail end of the epilogue. It is ostensibly in the 
service of this wish that he invokes Proust's appropriation of the 
Actaeon myth in which Charlus' unconsummated infatuation with a 
young page or chasseur (literally a huntsman: a reference no doubt to 
his livery, all that survives of his original office) is described. Proust's 
treatment of the myth is comic and highly irreverent-hence for me 
reminiscent of what I take to be the parodic treatment of penis-envy in 
Albertine's fantasy. Thus when the recalcitrant page (who, it turns 
out, had been bedded all the while with the night porter "at the hour 11
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when Diana rose") fails to respond to Charlus' blandishments, the 
baron takes a violent dislike to the boy. This dislike persists even after 
he learns that the page had been unaware of his interest, leading 
Charlus to declare that "were they to bring me the page like a dish of 
venison on a silver platter, I should thrust him away with a retching 
stomach," [m'apporterait-on le chasseur comme un simple gibier de 
chasse sur un plat d'argent, je le repousserais avec un vomissement 
(612-13).J. 
Paraphrase cannot do justice to this delicious set-piece, in which 
as with Albertine's ices, erudition and eloquence are expansively 
deployed in the service of a wicked fantasy from which desire itself 
(not to speak of its objects) does not escape unscathed. It falls so 
appositely into the context of Bowie's book that one might even 
imagine the preceding chapters to be a mere pretext for this marvelous 
trouvaille. Its immediate function however, is to allow the com- 
parison of Proust's version of the myth with Lacan's to the latter's 
disadvantage. Bowie's declared aim is "to set against the mentalizing 
pathos of Lacan's vision the thoroughly socialized eroticism of 
Proust's" (177). Despite my expressed suspicion that Proust's text 
(wittingly or unwittingly) parodies such hallowed psychoanalytic 
theories as penis-envy, for example, I am not sure I agree with Bowie's 
promotion of "Proust's inglorious Actaeon" as a "far richer emblem" 
than "Lacan's dismembered huntsman," if only because he would 
have been unable not only to make this judgment, but to read Proust as 
he does, had he not read Lacan. 
For my own part, I had barely finished reading about Proust's 
chasseur when my friend N. telephoned. She had received a gift of 
venison and wanted to know if I had a reliable recipe for cooking it. I 
believe that it is in such coincidences and trouvailles that we 
encounter the unconscious as Lacan imagined it: an action-at-a-dis- 
tance of which the narrator's telegram and my telephone call are 
emblematic, and the Lacanian unconscious so conceived is as much a 
social as it is a mental phenomenon. Thus even in the unlikely event 
that the author of Freud, Proust and Lacan had remained ignorant of 
"La Meprise et sa chance" it was in the air, so to speak, as the notion 
of bisexuality (with which Bowie associates it) had been, in the early 
years of the century. My authority here is Freud, in a letter to Fliess 
dated July 27, 1904, and quoted by Bowie. Occasioned by Fliess's 
apprehension that the priority of his claim for the bisexuality of all 
human beings had been usurped, the letter runs in part as follows: 12




You must admit that a resourceful mind can on its own easily take 
the step from the bisexual disposition of some individuals to 
extending it to all of them, though this step is your novum. For me 
personally, you have always (since 1901) been the author of the 
idea of bisexuality; I fear that in looking through the literature, 
you will fmd that many came at least close to you. (194, n. 28) 
What, one might ask, can it mean to be "the author of an idea" for the 
theoretician of the unconscious? 
In the final paragraph of this book Bowie recalls that his theme 
has been "theory's intermittent self-awareness as passion." For the 
three writers he has discussed, "a large part of that awareness," he 
claims "stems from the repeated discovery that theories and their 
authors are destructible." Thus, "all three writers cast themselves 
adrift upon that mental ocean where the spectacle of theory without 
end turns thought deathwards," leading Bowie to the conclusion that 
"It is in the self-declaring play of desire between certainty and extinc- 
tion, between bedrock and deadlock, that their new science begins." 
This seems to me as good an example of a "sententious moral state- 
ment" as any made by Proust's narrator, and as such, confirms 
Bowie's thesis about the desire for a hiatus that theorizing (his own 
included) inevitably breeds. My reading gaze is drawn however to the 
bedrock/deadlock conceit, which falls significantly short of Bowie's 
customarily elegant writing and is reminiscent of the kind of 
(uncharacteristic) "coarse" repetition of which he finds Proust guilty 
on p. 57. 
While Bowie is concerned to show that Proust's stylistic lapse 
may be justified on the grounds that "something willed and coherent" 
is going on, I am inclined to think that it is rather something unwilled 
(at least consciously), though not necessarily incoherent, that is at 
work in the last sentence of Freud, Proust and Lacan. "Bedrock" is 
Freud's term, cited, as we have seen, near the beginning of the book 
in a passage which after Bowie, I now recall at the end of this 
review: 
The female's supposed wish for a penis teases the speculative 
psychologist out of thought; it gives him 'the impression that . . . 
we have penetrated through all the psychological strata and have 
reached bedrock, and that thus our activities are at an end. This is 
probably true, since, for the psychical field, the biological field 13
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does in fact play the part of the underlying bedrock [des 
unterliegenden gewachensen Felsens]. 
"Bedrock" in German is Felsen, Felsens being the genitive form. 
Dare one read in the materiality of this signifier (which underlies the 
innocuous "bedrock") a portmanteau word combining the name of 
the woman whose action-at-a-distance I have perceived at work in 
this book and the sens (sense) or fiction that is the ransom of truth? If 
this observation makes no sense it may be justified precisely on those 
grounds, if we are to heed Lacan. Thus: "il n'y a de vdriW que de ce qui 
n'a aucun sens. "There is no truth except the truth of what makes no 
sense" (quoted in Felman, p. 40]), by which I presume he means the 
truth of the unconscious: "the knowledge that does not tolerate one's 
knowing that one knows." Perhaps Bowie, whose love of Keats 
pervades Freud, Proust and Lacan, might agree that this is all we 
know on earth. 
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